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“October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. The 
others are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, 
August, and February.” 
 
Mark Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson (1894) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this project is to determine if calendar effects observed in stock markets can be 
explained by prospect theory.  In order to answer this question, I have created an agent based model 
simulating a stock market. 
 One of the difficulties that separate economics from the physical sciences is the fact that the 
subject of our field of study is the product of the choices of human beings.  The famous paper by 
Stigler and Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum [1977] attempts to show that tastes, what are 
commonly referred to in economics as preferences, are in fact amenable to economic analysis.  
Although there have been great strides made over the course of the last generation in the understanding 
of the forces that generate economic decisions, behavioral economics and behavioral finance are still 
unable to explain many of the departures we see in the real world from what would be predicted by 
economic models.   
 One possible source of these anomalies, although by no means the only one, is the fact that 
while traditional macroeconomics studies the dynamics of groups, i.e. an entire economy, and 
traditional microeconomics studies the incentives and responses of individuals, either persons or firms, 
there is no primary sub-discipline devoted to the study of the emergent macro effects of individual 
micro actions.  While it is possible (and frequently done) to simply aggregate the micro to produce a 
model of the macro, this procedure fails to encompass any aspect of the system as more than the sum of 
its parts. 
 Due to the steady advance in computer processing speed and the commensurate reduction in 
computational cost, agent-based computational simulation provides an opportunity to investigate these 
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emergent phenomena.  Calendar effects in stock markets are one of the anomalies that has thus far 
eluded explanation by traditional economic modeling but may be understandable as an emergent 
product of interactions between market participants.   
 
1.1 Calendar Effects 
 Traditional stock market lore holds that there are significant correlations between stock returns 
and the calendar.  Some of the most well known are: The January effect - that returns are abnormally 
high in the month of January.  The Halloween effect - that the market tends to perform better in the six 
months ending October 31st than in the other half of the year.  The weekend effect - that market returns 
tend to be lower on Monday than on Friday.  There is not unanimity in the financial literature about 
whether these effects are real or myth, let alone what their cause might be if they do exist.  A number of 
studies have found calendar effects of various types in the market histories of many countries and 
across many decades.  Hansen and Lunde [2003] in a study of market indices from Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the United States find significant 
evidence of the January effect and the weekend effect.  Similarly, Swinkels, Laurens, et al. [2012] find 
significant evidence of end-of-year and end-of-month effects.  On the other hand, Sullivan, 
Timmermann, et al. [2001] conclude that evidence of calendar effects is a statistical anomaly produced 
by overly aggressive data mining.   
 On a theoretical basis, a January effect could be supported since tax liabilities are frequently 
calculated on a calendar year rather than a fiscal year.  No explanation, however, has been forthcoming 
about how the other calendar effects discussed above could exist for any significant length of time.  
The efficient market hypothesis predicts that any perceptible pattern in returns not counterbalanced by 
another factor external to the metric such as taxation, should be arbitraged away. 
1.2 Prospect Theory 
 In the 1970's, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky began to investigate the Allais paradox.  
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This is the observation made by French economist Maurice Allais that people will routinely make 
different choices when presented with mathematically identical gambles depending on how they are 
presented.  The foundational paper of  Kahneman and Tversky's work, Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk [1979] began to model this phenomenon.  They characterize it as a process of 
decision making by heuristics.  People judge uncertain outcomes based on decision rules that are 
tractable, sacrificing precision for reliability.  The commonly used rule of thumb is to seek gains and 
avoid losses.  This simple rule, however, while quite reliable sacrifices accuracy in two ways: First, it 
ranks outcomes lexiographically, giving an absolute preference for any perceived gain over any 
perceived loss without factoring the associated probabilities of those outcomes.  Second, it defines the 
outcomes as relative to the current position.  That is, it consideres an outcome as profit or loss 
compared to current wealth, rather than on an absolute scale. 
 An example of this phenomenon in action is as follows: If you offer a subject a choice between 
a certainty of receiving $100 or a 50% chance of winning $210, they will more likely than not choose 
the certain $100, even though the expected value of the second choice is $105.  This is consistent with 
the subject being risk averse.  They are willing to 'pay' the loss of a potential $5 to 'buy' the avoidance 
of the uncertainty in the second choice.  However, if the same subject is offered a certainty of a $100 
loss or an 50% probability of a $210 loss, they will be more likely to choose the second alternative than 
the first.  The first choice has an expected value of - $100 and the second has an expected value of - 
$105.  Given that the subject was the same individual with the same risk preference, he should be 
willing to again 'pay' the same amount of $5 to avoid the same amount of uncertainty of the second 
choice.  And yet, that expectation is consistently violated in the real world. 
  Kahneman and Tversky proposed that the key to understanding this effect was the fact that 
whether the prospect from the point of view of the subject was a gain or a loss was not included in the 
calculation of the expected value of each choice.  In essence, people first ranked the outcomes by 
whether they were a positive or negative deviation from present wealth, and only after that considered 
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the expected value of the outcome.  In practice, this results in differing preferences for risk for gains 
and losses.  People want to win, therefore they tend to take the gamble that maximizes the probability 
of winning.  Similarly, people want to avoid losing so they will tend to take gambles that reduce the 
probability of a loss.  The resultant differeing risk profiles based on deviations from current wealth can 
be seen in the asymetrical pattern shown in figure 11. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 The possible relevance of prospect theory to stock market calendar effects is in their respective 
temporality.  Calendar effects are by definition temporal phenomena; changes in effective risk 
preference due to imperfect heuristics are not.  However, if we go further and view the reference point 
of wealth as changing over time, then non-optimizing risk preferences could acquire a temporal 
component as well.  When weighing two uncertain alternatives, if the subject must incorporate his 
current wealth into the decision function, a choice must be made of 'wealth as of when?'  A reference 
point in time must be included as part of the definition of the reference point in wealth.  
 When would the temporal reference point most likely be?  If someone has to define their wealth 
as of a relatively recent date in order to make a current economic decision, how do they choose among 
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"Value function in Prospect Theory", drawing by Marc Oliver Rieger. Released under the GNU Free Documentation 
License. 
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an infinite set of possibilities?  This is a version of the "where to meet in New York problem."  If two 
people wanted to meet in New York City at a particular time but had not agreed on a location, where 
would they go?  They would fall back on common cultural geographic reference points and choose 
Times Square or perhaps the Empire State building.  In the same way, someone who needs to choose a 
recent point in time, absent any other considerations, will tend to fall back on common cultural 
temporal reference points and choose the start of the day, the start of the week, or the start of the 
month. 
 On this basis, I propose that the interaction of commonly held time reference points input into 
prospect theoretic decision functions could generate highly correlated, boundedly rational economic 
decisions in large groups.  My hypothesis is that calendar effects are caused by the inconsistent risk 
preferences described by prospect theory. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
 This agent based stock market simulation is at core an interaction between traders and stocks.  
As in a real world stock market, this market begins with human beings making choices in a complex 
and uncertain environment.  A variable number of traders use one of ten different strategies to evaluate 
each stock based on current price, current dividend, price history, dividend history, cash on hand, and 
interest rate to decide how to rebalance their portfolio by issuing an order to buy or sell a number of 
shares.  Real world stock markets typically allow both market orders and limit orders.  A market order 
is a request from a trader to buy or sell a specified number of shares at the best price immediately 
available.  A limit order is a request to buy or sell a specific number of shares when possible at a 
specific price or better.  Market orders sacrifice price predictability for guaranteed quantity execution, 
while limit orders sacrifice quantity predictability for a guaranteed price.  Since market orders always 
execute and limit orders do not, market orders increase liquidity while limit orders reduce it.  Faced 
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with this difference, I chose to implement market orders only.  Including limit orders in the simulation 
would have required me to also simulate a class of market makers (entities that provide market liquidity 
by buying or selling in unlimited amounts) or allow trades to not clear, which would be equivalent to 
allowing the market to not achieve price equilibrium. 
 After researching artificial market designs, [LeBaron, 2001], [Benhammadaa and Chikhib, 
2012], [Samanidou1, Zschischang, et al., 2007], it became apparent that a central issue of agent-based 
market design is the choice of structure for order execution and price discovery.  Two basic approaches 
are common: order book and Walrasian auctioneer.  In an order book system traders place limit orders 
which include price boundaries for their desired trades.  These are entered into a queue called 
(unsurprisingly) an order book. Buy orders and sell orders with overlapping quantities and price 
boundaries are executed, usually at the price of whichever order was placed first.  These overlapping 
limit orders function indistinguishably from market orders.  Limit orders that do not overlap are not 
immediately executed and are stored in the order book.  An example may be helpful at this point.  
Assume a market with 4 traders, each placing a limit order for a given stock with a prior price of $15 
per share.  The orders are as seen in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Example Limit Orders 
Trader number Trade direction Quantity Limit price 
1 Buy 100 $15 
2 Sell 150 $14 
3 Sell 75 $15 
4 Buy 75 $16 
 
 Trader 4 wants to buy 75 shares and is willing to pay up to $16 per share.  Trader 3 wants to sell 
75 shares and is willing to take accept as low as $15 per share.  These trades overlap in both price and 
quantity, so they can be matched and executed.  Assuming the orders were entered into the order book 
8 
in order of trader number, then trader 3's order was placed before trader 4's order and therefore the 
trade will execute at trader 3's limit price of $15 and are both removed from the order book.  Traders 1 
and 2 have orders that overlap in price (trader 1 offers $15, trader 2 will accept $14) but they are not 
fully overlapping in quantity.  Trader 2 can sell 100 shares to trader1 at $15.  Trader 1's order has then 
been executed in full and it is removed from the book, but trader 2's order has only been partially filled.  
Trader 2 has sold 100 shares leaving an open order in the book of an offer to sell 50 shares at $14. 
 Since the outstanding order is to sell, inducing other traders to alter their orders to increase the 
quantity demanded to match requires the price to decrease.  In other words, the previous price of $15 is 
now too high.  The price adjustment equation used in the first version of the Santa Fe Institute artificial 
stock market was: 𝑝(𝑡+1) = 𝛼𝑝𝑡 ∑ (𝐵𝑖 − 𝑆𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1                                                              (1) 
Where p is price, t is time, B is shared ordered to be bought, S is shared ordered to be sold, and i 
increments over n traders.  α is the amount to adjust the price for a given quantity of unfilled net orders. 
  
 As described in "Building the Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market" [LeBaron, 2002], this procedure 
caused serious problems.  The market showed unacceptably high sensitivity to the value of α.  If set 
slightly too low, the market would be unable to adjust quickly enough to approach equilibrium and the 
number of unfilled orders would accumulate.  If set a bit too high, market volatility would explode 
causing wild swings between unexecuted buy orders and sell orders.  Preliminary versions of my 
simulation used this system and exhibited the same behavior. 
 To alleviate this problem, I redesigned the price discovery mechanism to pattern a Walrasian 
auctioneer.  The Walrasian auctioneer is a simplified economic model of the process equilibrating 
quantity supplied and demanded.  Assume an omniscient auctioneer.  At every point in time this 
auctioneer will determine the supply and demand functions of all current and potential market 
participants and will adjust the market price to equate quantity offered for sale with quantity desired to 
9 
be purchased, thus clearing the market.  Although this mechanism is simpler than an order book system 
in theory, it proved intractably more complex in implementation.  I resolved this dilemma by designing 
a hybrid between the two systems. 
 I created a price discovery system with nearly the simplicity of an order book, but with the 
advantage of a Walrasian auctioneer in adjusting price prior to executing trade orders.  In this system, 
an auctioneer proposes a price and queries the traders for preliminary orders.  If the quantity supplied 
does not equal quantity demanded, the preliminary orders are discarded and the price is altered a fixed 
amount in the direction of equilibrium indicated by the sign of the net order quantity.  This new 
candidate price is then presented to the traders and they are again asked to submit preliminary orders.  
This process iterates until a price is found that returns a zero net demand order set.  This process has 
the dual advantages of not requiring the auctioneer to know the supply and demand functions of the 
traders while simultaneously eliminating α from equation 1.  This solution proved to both stable and 
acceptably fast running on the available less than state of the art hardware. 
 With the infrastructure of a reliable market clearing mechanism built, broadening the 
heterogeneity of the traders was a relatively simple task.  I sequentially added multiple types of traders, 
each utilizing one basic trading strategy.  The first trader variant are called "technical traders", 
"chartists", or sometimes "noise traders".  This type of trader uses a strategy predicated on the 
assumption that markets follow discernible repeating patterns.  I implemented this in its simplest form; 
these agents viewed the recent history of the price of the stock and assumed the trend direction would 
continue.  If the price has been going up, it will continue to go up, therefore buy.  If the price has been 
going down, it will continue to go down, therefore sell.  The second trading strategy is called 
"fundamental" trading.  Traders using this strategy ignore the patterns of price movement of stock and 
instead focus on the quality of the firm the stock represents.  In this model, the "fundamental" quality 
of the firm is known from its earnings expressed as profits paid out in dividends.  This definition has 
the great advantage of taking the staggering complexity of judging a corporation's economic strength 
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and reducing it to a single number.  The third type of trader added was the "contrarian".  Contrarian 
trading is simply to do the opposite of what other traders are seen to do. 
 After creating these three types of traders, I multiplied them by three levels of aggressiveness 
yielding nine trading strategies: technical passive, technical mid, technical aggressive, contrarian 
passive, contrarian mid, contrarian aggressive, fundamental passive, fundamental mid, and fundamental 
aggressive.  The degree of aggression determined what percentage of a trader's cash or portfolio to 
commit to each trade, from 5% for passive traders up to 25% for aggressive traders. 
 During the presentation of this model to the class, Dr. Tian/you raised a question that I 
interpreted as a concern that the complexity and multitude of trading strategies might end up hard 
coding in behaviors that could not be distinguished from emergent features of the market.  After 
additional research, I discovered that your suggestion of zero intelligence traders was a both reasonable 
and potentially interesting option.  On that basis, I added a second independent system of traders 
composed exclusively of zero intelligence agents.  One of the two parallel populations of traders, either 
zero intelligence or optimizing, can be chosen to be used for each run while the other is disabled.  This 
option is available through a simple True/False parameter setting2. 
 
2.2 Design details 
 Model variables are listed in table 1.   
Table 1. Model variables 
Variable Type Description 
NUMBER_OF_RUNS INTEGER [1,∞) Number of times the simulation will be repeated 
NUMBER_OF_STOCKS INTEGER [1,∞) Number of stocks in each market 
NUMBER_OF_TRADERS INTEGER [1,∞) Number of traders in each market 
NUMBER_OF_DAYS INTEGER [1,∞) Number of days of trading to be simulated 
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 As an aside, I discovered that the market dynamics were every bit as complex and interesting using zero intelligence 
agents as using complicated optimizers, and system performance seemed more stable as an added benefit.  In short, you 
were right. 
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CASH FLOAT (0,∞) Starting cash balance of each trader 
ZERO_INTEL BOOLEAN [T/F] Use zero intelligence traders instead of optimizing agents 
PROSPECT BOOLEAN [T/F] Include prospect irrationality in trades 
PROSPECT_RATE FLOAT (0,∞) Magnitude of prospect irrationality 
AVG_LOOKBACK_DAYS INTEGER [1,∞) Number of days traders remember 
INTEREST_RATE FLOAT (0,∞) Rate of return on cash per day 
MARKET_TREND FLOAT (0,∞) Change in average stock price per day 
HISTORY INTEGER [1,∞) Number of days of initial market history 
wealth FLOAT (0,∞) Cash plus value of stocks owned for each trader 
price FLOAT (0,∞) Current stock price 
dividend FLOAT (0,∞) Current stock dividend 
marketindex FLOAT (0,∞) Average price of all stocks in a market 
quantity INTEGER [0,∞) Number of shares to be bought or sold by a trader 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Model parameters 
 
The parameters in this model are listed in all capital letters both in table 1 and in the model code.  For 
the simulation to run reliably, there must be more than a small handful of traders.  As the number is 
reduced below roughly a dozen, the market will increasingly exhibit erratic behavior.  This is not a flaw 
in the model, but rather an accurate reflection of the reality of real work market function.  In the 
extreme case of only two traders, their supply and demand schedules may not make any mutually 
beneficial trades possible.  A large number of traders essentially guarantees that a sufficient number of 
trades will occur for meaningful results to be generated. 
 Interest rate determines the desirability of holding cash for a given market environment.  As 
interest rate is reduced, traders using all types of optimizing strategies will tend to shift resources out of 
cash and into stocks causing the market index to rise.  Conversely, a very high rate of interest will tend 
to shift resources out of the stock market to be held as interest bearing cash.  If sufficiently high, the 
advantageous return on cash will cause the market index to approach zero. 
12 
 Market trend is included as an optional setting to simulate trader behavior within an artificially 
induced bull or bear market.  It was always set to zero for this experiment, but may be employed in 
future research. 
 History is calculated as two times average lookback days plus one.  It is included because all 
optimizing traders take past stock and/or dividend behavior into account when deciding on a stock 
order.  A synthetic history must be created and available for traders to reference on the first day of 
trading or their decision functions would fail. 
 
2.1.2 Agents 
There are four classes in the model: traders, stocks, markets, and simulation. 
 
2.1.2.1 Traders 
 As discussed previously in section two, traders may be chosen to act as zero intelligence agents, 
with their trading behavior limited only by a liquidity constraint, or by setting ZERO_INTEL to false 
traders will utilize various optimizing trading strategies.  Optimizing traders have a memory of their 
prior trades, portfolio, cash, and calculated wealth extending back on average the number of days 
specified in AVG_LOOKBACK_DAYS.  A random deviation from this number is set for each trader at 
its creation.  Traders also have memory for the same length of time of the price and dividend history for 
any stock they are considering trading.  After a trader creates a trade order, it will be modified by a 
prospect function if PROSPECT is set to True.  This is the same for both zero intelligence and 
optimizing agents. 
 
2.1.2.2 Stocks 
 Stocks exist in this simulation as passive recipients of actions by traders and by the effects of 
both market wide and stock specific news.  Stocks have a price, dividend, and unlimited history of the 
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same.  Although an unlimited number of stocks can be used, only one was created for the purposes of 
this experiment.  This made a binary choice for traders between a generic market index and cash.  
 
2.1.2.3 Market 
 The simulation can accommodate multiple markets running simultaneously but this feature is 
not used in this experiment.  Only one market is used.  Within the market class are functions to 
simulate the effect of exogenous market relevant news entering the system.  The first of these randomly 
generates news effecting the entire market.  This effect may be positive or negative and is implemented 
such that the average stock will move in a particular direction by a particular amount, but there will be 
variation between stocks with a small number moving in the opposite direction as the market as a 
whole.  The second function randomly introduces news relevant to a single stock only.  This is 
introduced as an alteration in the profitability of the underlying company expressed as a change in the 
dividend. 
 
2.1.2.4 Simulation 
 The single instance of the simulation class creates and runs the model.  It includes functions for 
price discovery, trade execution, account reconciliation, and output.  Output takes three forms.  If the 
NUMBER_OF_RUNS parameter is set to one, a graph will be created showing the level of the market 
index over the course of the run.  A comma delimited TXT file will be created containing day number 
and index price for each day of the run.  If the NUMBER_OF_RUNS parameter is set to two or more, 
the graph is suppressed and a comma delimited TXT file is created containing run number and final 
index price for each run. 
 
3. Testing 
3.1 Verification 
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 Various diagnostic runs of the model were conducted printing each variable in turn.  Only one 
major problem was found.  I observed that changing the interest rate was not having the expected effect 
on stock prices.  When I increased the interest rate, stock prices went up instead of down.  If cash was 
returning a high yield, it should draw resources away from stocks and make the price decline.  After 
substantial investigation, I realized that the money paid to traders as interest on their cash holdings was 
being created de novo and this additional money was being used to purchase more stock, even if at a 
lower rate.  In essence, I had accidentally simulated the inflationary fiat money creation of an 
irresponsible monetary authority.  To remedy the situation, I had a choice to fully simulate and control a 
central bank, or stop injecting money into the system.  Although I hope to introduce a central bank into 
the simulation at a later date, for this experiment I prevented money creation by not crediting interest 
payments to traders accounts. 
 
3.2 Sensitivity 
 Sensitivity of the model was tested with respect to four variables: interest rate, average look 
back days, number of traders, and prospect rate.  The model was run 100 times with all four variables 
set at their reference values.  The model was then run an additional 100 times with a single variable 
increased by 5% while all others were held constant.  This procedure was repeated for each of the four 
variables.  Sensitivity was calculated as percent change in market index value divided by percent 
change in the variable, averaged over 100 simulation runs.  Results are listed in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Local Sensitivity Analysis 
Variable Reference value Sensitivity 
Interest rate 0.01 -0.0231 
Average look back days 20 0.0109 
Number of traders 100 0.0172 
Prospect rate 0.1 0.0024 
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3.3 Robustness 
 Robustness of the model was tested with respect to four variables: number of stocks, average 
look back days, number of traders, and cash.  For each variable, the simulation was run 100 times with 
the variable moving through all plausible values while all other variables were held constant.  In all 
four cases the results were within expected ranges with no OLS regression line showing any substantial 
unexpected trend.  Results are listed in figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively. 
 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 The simulation was configured with the following parameter values: 
NUMBER_OF_RUNS=1 
NUMBER_OF_STOCKS=1 
NUMBER_OF_TRADERS=100 
NUMBER_OF_DAYS=365 
CASH=10000 
AVG_LOOKBACK_DAYS=20 
INTEREST_RATE=1.00 
MARKET_TREND=0.0   
PROSPECT_RATE=0.5 
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 It was then run four times, once each using the following settings: 
Zero intelligence agents with no prospect irrationality 
Zero intelligence agents with prospect irrationality 
Optimizing agents with no prospect irrationality 
Optimizing agents with prospect irrationality 
 
 For each run data was grouped by day of the week to determine if market returns showed a 
correlation with a particular day.  Summary statistics are shown in table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics by day of the week 
Group Statistic Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Zero intelligence 
No prospect 
Mean 59.77 60.17 60.02 59.60 59.39 
Standard Deviation 14.07 14.06 13.46 12.93 12.54 
Zero intelligence 
Prospect 
Mean 282.68 284.27 283.28 282.93 283.40 
Standard Deviation 78.76 79.05 76.58 75.85 75.68 
Optimizing 
No prospect 
Mean 97.48 97.60 97.66 97.61 97.30 
Standard Deviation 19.52 19.24 20.38 20.17 20.70 
Optimizing 
Prospect 
Mean 55.62 55.94 55.94 55.82 55.39 
Standard Deviation 21.21 21.97 22.52 22.17 21.95 
 
 Analysis of variance was conducted for each group by day of the week to determine if returns 
were significantly different on any day of the week within any group.  In all four cases P-values were 
greater than 0.99 indicating no evidence of difference between the days of the week.  Results are shown 
in tables 4. 
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Table 4. ANOVA by day of the week 
Group F-statistic P-value 
Zero intelligence 
No prospect 0.0397 0.9969 
Zero intelligence 
Prospect 0.0045 0.9999 
Optimizing 
No prospect 0.0038 0.9999 
Optimizing 
Prospect 0.0084 0.9998 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 There was no sign of any calendar effect in any of the configurations tested to a very high 
degree of confidence.  In addition, there was no obvious difference in the market results generated 
between optimizing traders following multiple complex strategies and simple zero intelligence traders 
constrained only by their respective liquidity. 
 This leads me to conclude one of three things must be true.  Either 1.) my simulation failed to 
generate calendar effects because it is an inadequate model of a real world stock market, or 2.) it failed 
because it is an adequate model, but day of the week calendar effects found in other research are 
statistical anomalies created by excessive data mining, or 3.) calendar effects do exist in real world 
markets, but they are not caused by prospect theory irrationality.  On the basis of this experiment, I 
have no factual grounds to differentiate between these possibilities. 
 Stepping away from the data, I do have a gut feeling that my model was implemented 
adequately to test my theory.  My suspicion is that weekday based abnormal returns in large efficient 
markets are statistical ghosts rather than real phenomena.  If economists can find patterns in market 
data, the famous (or infamous) quants on Wall Street with access to nearly unlimited computational 
resources could surely find them as well in pursuit of profits through arbitrage. 
 A next possible step for my stock market simulation may be to rebuild it from the start, but this 
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time in Java rather than Python.  I expect to be learning Java as part of future CSS courses and 
recreating the simulation in a new language would provide an opportunity for comparison as well as 
good practice to develop my programming skills. 
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